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DD/P 5471

24 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/SE

SUBJECT: Albania; Tito's position and recent statements concerning his attitude toward Albania.

REFERENCE: Memo dtd 9 April 1953 fr SE/FI to AD/DCI, subject: "Comments made by C. D. Jackson to [ ] on 9 April 1953."

1. This memorandum will serve to record some "loose ends" with regard to Albania and the possibilities and timing of an Albanian coup. You will recall that during the first week of April Mr. C. D. Jackson stated to me (and subsequently to you on April 9) that he had understood Adam Watson of the British Embassy to say that while Tito was in London recently he had told British authorities that an Albanian coup could and should be accomplished right away, and that Tito was prepared to enter into negotiations with the British and the Americans in this connection if agreement could be reached with the Greeks and Italians. Mr. Jackson had further understood Mr. Watson to say that Tito had asserted that he would be delighted to participate in such an endeavor -- without annexation of Albania and on the basis of maintaining the political and geographical integrity of Albania. I said to Mr. Jackson that this information surprised me very much in view of our understanding that Tito does not consider the time to be ripe for an Albanian coup, and he suggested that I speak directly with Mr. Watson. (In addition to the impressions received at the recent conference in Belgrade which you attended, we had also seen a State Department telegram from London, dated March 25, which indicated that in Tito's discussion with the British Foreign Office it had been agreed that the Albanian situation should be left undisturbed. Tito had volunteered a statement to the effect that he had no intention of attempting to infringe upon Albanian independence and that he understood Greek intentions were the same. He had not conveyed the impression to the Foreign Office that he expected a collapse of the Albanian regime.)

2. When I talked to Mr. Watson, he informed me that he had not intended to convey the impression to C. D. Jackson which the latter had received with respect to Tito's view of timing. Mr. Watson provided to me an extract from a message which he had received from the Foreign Office, as follows:

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
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"Marshal Tito himself raised subject of Albania in conversation with Prime Minister and myself on March 17th. He said that it was the Yugoslav Government's firm conviction, which he thought the Greek Government shared, that Albania should remain independent. Only in case of an act of aggression against Yugoslavia would latter be compelled to take precautionary measures, and then only after previous discussion with the Greek and Turkish Governments."

3. Mr. Watson acknowledged that otherwise he had spoken to Mr. Jackson along rather affirmative -- and even "activist" -- lines, although pointing out that the Foreign Office would probably be opposed to an Albanian operation (a) until the Korean peace feelers have been fully explored; (b) the Italian elections were behind us, and (c) it had been determined that an Albanian move by the West would not have the effect of consolidating the factions within the Kremlin which now appear to be engaged in a struggle for power.

4. Subsequent to my conversation with Mr. Watson, Mr. C. D. Jackson acknowledged that he had misunderstood Mr. Watson, and had drawn an erroneous conclusion that Tito thought this was the moment to strike.

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5. In this general connection, reference is made to the PSB luncheon discussion of this subject of some two weeks ago, at the conclusion of which Mr. Dulles was requested to solicit the views of Mr. Ellsworth Bunker, and to the memorandum of Mr. Bunker's statements (a copy of which has been furnished to you). Mr. Bunker stressed the point that the subject of an Albanian coup should not be broached until after the Italian elections, and he questioned the desirability of injecting this issue into Yugoslav-Italian relations until the issue of Trieste has been settled.

6. It is my understanding that unless and until we receive a new "go-ahead" from policy levels, we should continue along the lines of our present program, viz., the maintenance of a continuous

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propaganda and PW attack against the Albanian regime, including the encouragement of passive resistance on the part of the population and non-cooperation with the Government; efforts to obtain significant penetrations of the regime by better-selected and more high-level agents; attempts to divide and cause apprehension among governmental officials, and mutual distrust and suspicion as between them., etc.

[ ] [ ]

FRANK G. WISNER  
Deputy Director (Plans)

London 5261 (State Cable) dtd March 25. - Top Secret - sent you separately.

cc: DCI  
C/PP  
C/PPC

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